产业集群信用优势的层面与博弈分析  

Analysis in Hierarchy & Game theory of the Highly Credible Advantages of the Industrial Cluster

作　　者：赵强[1] 

机构地区：[1]东北大学工商管理学院

出　　处：《工业工程与管理》2005年第4期31-34,共4页Industrial Engineering and Management

摘　　要：首先从层面角度对产业集群信用优势进行分析,诚信经营的企业家、高质量生产的经营信用、合同签订与执行上的合约信用等综合作用,构建起产业集群的信用优势;然后从博弈论角度进行分析,应用古诺模型,进行厂商的一次性博弈、厂商的重复博弈分析得出:产业集群内的竞合关系,信息的高透明度,企业的高折现率和较高的再次遭遇率使集群内企业实现了“集体理性”,更偏重于采取高信用高回报的行为,从而体现出产业集群的信用优势。Firstly this paper analyzes the credit advantages of the industrial cluster from the hierarchical aspect, and establishes a comprehensive construction of the credit advantages on the basis of credible entrepreneur, the running credit for qualified production and the contractual credit for signing-up and implementation of the contract. After that, it analyzes the just-for-once game and repeated games between the producers by the application of the game theory and Cournot model： the co-opetition inside the industrial cluster, highly transparent information, high conversion rate of firms and high re-encounter rate, together make the firms inside the cluster attain the goal of collective reason, and make them be in favor of the highly credible and rewarding behaviors, so that the credit advantages of the industrial cluster can be embodied.

关 键 词：产业集群 信用 博弈 

分 类 号：F207[经济管理—国民经济]