董事会结构与我国证券投资基金费率关系的实证研究  

Relationship between the Structure of Director Board and Fees of Investment Fund in China: An Empirical Study

作　　者：林树[1] 汤震宇[1] 

机构地区：[1]复旦大学管理学院

出　　处：《上海管理科学》2005年第4期51-52,共2页Shanghai Management Science

摘　　要：本文以2004年6月30日以前国内基金管理公司成立的所有证券投资基金为样本,以基金管理费率和开放式基金最大赎回费率的高低为指标,实证检验了国内基金管理公司的董事会结构对维护基金投资人利益的作用。结果发现:一、董事会规模对基金费率的影响不确定;二、独立董事在董事会中的比重与基金管理费率负相关;三、国内基金管理公司在引入独立董事后确实对维护投资人利益起到一定的作用。Management fee and the highest back-end load are used as the indexes to test if the structure of director board affects the fund shareholders＇ benefit in China. The sample is all dosed-end funds and open funds founded before Jun 30,2004 in China. As results, we found no evident relationship between the scale of director structure and fund fees. Negative relationship was found between the percentage of independent directors and management fee. And we also found that fund shareholders＇ benefit was protected better after the entrance of independent directors.

关 键 词：基金 董事会 独立董事 费率 证券投资基金 董事会结构 赎回费率 实证研究 基金管理公司 2004年6月 

分 类 号：F832.5[经济管理—金融学] F279.246