碳排放交易市场排放权的拍卖方案设计  

Auction Design of Permits in Carbon Emissions Trading Market

作　　者：曾鸣[1] 何深[1] 杨玲玲[1] 马向春[1] 

机构地区：[1]华北电力大学能源与电力经济研究咨询中心,北京102206

出　　处：《水电能源科学》2010年第9期161-163,75,共4页Water Resources and Power

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70671041);美国能源基金会基金资助项目(G-1006-12630)

摘　　要：针对碳排放权的合理分配是碳排放交易市场得以有效运转并最终成功实现减排的关键,在比较分析无偿分配及拍卖分配的不同影响的基础上,以电力企业为例,将拍卖分配方式引入碳排放权交易市场中,提出了标准增价拍卖方式的定量化模型,并给出不同排放率下企业采取严格竞标和策略竞标两种方案的仿真算例,分析了不同策略组合下的企业利润,从而为我国碳排放权分配方式的设计提供参考。The rational allocation of carbon emissions permits is the key to keep carbon emissions trading markets operating effectively and realize successful reduction emissions ultimately.On the basis of comparing the different impacts between free allocation and auction allocation,the auction allocation is introduced into carbon emissions trading market with the example of power company.A quantitative model of standard ascending clock auction is proposed.The simulation examples with combination of sincere bidding and strategic bidding are presented to analyze the corporate profits of different strategies taken by companies under the different emission ratio.Thus,it provides reference for design allocation of carbon emissions permits.

关 键 词：碳排放 交易市场 排放权 拍卖方式 方案设计 Carbon EMISSIONS 分配方式 企业利润 定量化模型 有效运转 无偿分配 策略竞标 合理分配 比较分析 仿真算例 电力企业 策略组合 排放率 减排 基础 

分 类 号：TK79[动力工程及工程热物理—流体机械及工程] TV7[水利工程—水利水电工程]