从我国立法回避制度看立法博弈机制  

Legislative Game: On China's Legislation Avoidance System

作　　者：秦耘[1] 张玉洁[1] 

机构地区：[1]河北经贸大学法学院,河北石家庄050061

出　　处：《河北经贸大学学报（综合版）》2010年第4期38-41,共4页Journal of Hebei University of Economics and Business(Comprehensive Edition)

摘　　要：为了有效地避免立法实践中部门之间争夺权力,并将不当利益部门化、法制化的问题,我国某些地方制定了行政立法回避制度。但是,该制度有违公平正义的现代法治理念,不具有合理性。民主是实现立法公正的程序的关键,而形成不同利益主体间的博弈乃为民主的核心。因此,就民主立法的本质而言,只有让利益的关系者最大范围的参与到立法中来,让社会各方积极发表建议和意见,从各自的立场出发进行其利益的博弈,让私利无处遁形。In order to avoid the legislative struggle for power between legislation departments,and protection of the departments' interests through legislation,China has designed the avoidance system in executive legislation.However,such system is contrary to the modern legal concept.Democracy is the key to the just legislation procedures and the core of democracy lies in the gaming of different interest groups.Therefore,in terms of the nature of democratic legislation,the gaming between the various stakeholders,allowing them to participate in the legislation process,and the social groups who are encouraged to express their opinions,will help to eliminate any private interests.

关 键 词：立法回避制度 博弈机制 不当利益 民主立法 建议和意见 立法实践 立法公正 公平正义 法治理念 主体间 让利益 合理性 法制化 部门化 中部 行政 问题 社会 权力 核心 

分 类 号：N55[自然科学总论]