非正式社会结构下民间信用演进与生命周期  

The Evolution and Lifecycle of Chinese Folk Credit under the Informal Social Framework

作　　者：罗杰[1] 黄君慈[2] 

机构地区：[1]华东交通大学经管学院,江西南昌330013 [2]厦门大学经济学院金融系,福建厦门361005

出　　处：《财经研究》2005年第9期49-59,70,共12页Journal of Finance and Economics

摘　　要：在非正式制度为主导的农村非正式社会结构中,基于特殊信任主义的民间信用,其博弈主体由于交易域和社会交换域的关联博弈和基于声誉的私人契约执行机制,使得民间信用契约具有自我执行的内在机制。随着农村非正式社会结构的制度转型,使得特殊信任主义向一般信任主义演变,并促使中国民间信用制度沿着其生命周期轨迹发生适应性变迁。In an informal social structure dominated by the informal institutions, the particularistic trust is the basis of folk credit. Because of the relating games and the reputation-based private mechanism,the contract of folk credit is intrinsically self-enforcing. With the institutional transition of the informal social framework of Chinese country, particularistic trust will evolve to universalistic trust, and the institution of Chinese folk credit will take its adaptive transition according to its lifecycle.

关 键 词：关联博弈 信任差序格局 特殊信任主义 一般信任主义 民间信用 

分 类 号：F832.35[经济管理—金融学]