虚拟组织集体选择与讨价还价问题博弈分析  

Game Analysis on Collective-Choice Problem and Bargaining Problem of Virtual Organization

作　　者：邢永杰[1] 张世英[1] 

机构地区：[1]天津大学管理学院,天津300072

出　　处：《系统工程理论方法应用》2005年第4期289-293,298,共6页Systems Engineering Theory·Methodology·Applications

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(69874028)

摘　　要：提出了虚拟组织的贝叶斯集体选择问题和贝叶斯讨价还价问题,指出了合作伙伴在虚拟组织中的相关策略;运用博弈方法分析了集体选择中的信息激励约束与参与约束,证明了贝叶斯讨价还价的区间和均衡的合作条件,论证了讨价还价问题中的合作失败成本与合作延误成本,以及两者之间的关系。This paper gives the Bayesian collective-choice problem and Bayesian bargaining problem of the virtual organization through analyzing the context from which virtual organization arise. By using the method of game analysis, it analyses the informational incentive constraints and participation constraints of virtual organization collective-choice. The space and equilibrium of cooperation conditions are argued, and the costs of failure to cooperate and cost of delay of cooperation are also dwelled on.

关 键 词：虚拟组织 贝叶斯集体选择 贝叶斯讨价还价 博弈 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]