“财政自利”与“财政立宪”研究  

Fiscal Self-interest and Fiscal Constitution

作　　者：李一花[1] 

机构地区：[1]山东大学经济学院,山东济南250100

出　　处：《当代财经》2005年第9期42-47,共6页Contemporary Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家社科基金项目"解决县乡财政困难研究"(项目号05CJY029)的阶段性成果。

摘　　要：财政自利是政府作为“经济人”的一种必然现象。财政自利不仅可以发生在政府与社会公众之间,而且也发生在政府之间。唯有对政府财政活动进行立宪约束,才能从根本上制约政府的过分自利而损害社会或下级政府的行为发生。本文主要从依法建立民主理财、民主决策监督机制,实现纳税人对政府的有效约束以及依法建立政府间合理分权制衡机制等两个方面比较全面的分析了政府财政自利的约束和制衡。fiscal self-interest is a natural result of government as an economic man. It may be not only reflected between the government and the public, but also reflected between the higher level and lower level government. Only putting government fiscal into constitution control, can we restrict the government self-interest to prevent the society and the lower level government from harm. This paper analyses systematically the control and restrict methods of fiscal self-interest.

关 键 词：政府 财政自利 财政立宪 

分 类 号：F812.2[经济管理—财政学]