银行信息披露制度与银行系统稳定性研究  

A Study on the Information Disclosure System and the Stability of Bank in China

作　　者：冉勇[1] 钟子明[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆市400044

出　　处：《中央财经大学学报》2005年第10期25-29,75,共6页Journal of Central University of Finance & Economics

摘　　要：建立商业银行信息披露制度是我国金融改革中较重要的一环,一般的认识是信息制度的建立将使金融机构运作更审慎,有利于提高整个金融系统的稳定性;但本文通过博弈模型证明:赋予我国商业银行国家信用与进行信息披露制度之间存在着一定的冲突,目前我国对金融体系的过度保护反而会降低商业银行信息披露的对银行体系稳定性的改进,合适的改革次序应是国家信用在金融机构中的先行退出也即建立一个合适的存款保险制度,其次才是规范的信息披露制度的建立。China are trying to reform it＇s fragile financial industry and the setting up of information disclosure system is one of the most discussed regions. Generally, the transparency regulation aims at strengthening market discipline can help the financial institute perform more prudently and reduce financial fragility . However, the research on this topic seldom consider the cost of the information disclosure system, and especially the extensive financial institute protect from the central bank or the state financial department will render such information disclosure system inefficient. In this paper we will use a game theory model to prove, first, how an extensive financial safety net may eliminate the disciplinary effect of transparency regulation and Second, achieving transparency is costly for banks, as it dilutes their charter values, and hence also reduces their private costs of risk - taking. We conclude that we should comprehensively consider the whole schedule of financial system reform and especial notice that the set up of deposit insurance system go before the set up of information disclosure system.

关 键 词：信息披露 存款保险 博弈 银行系统稳定性 

分 类 号：F831.1[经济管理—金融学]