不完全信息下拍卖市场的结构与交易效率  

The Framework and Trading Efficiency of Auction Market under Incomplete Information

作　　者：危启才[1] 

机构地区：[1]华中科技大学,武汉工业学院

出　　处：《数量经济技术经济研究》2005年第10期142-150,共9页Journal of Quantitative & Technological Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(项目批准号:70301003)。

摘　　要：本文着重研究了不完全信息下拍卖市场的结构及其对拍卖市场交易效率的影响。通过合理地引入刻画市场结构的参数,对不完全信息下的拍卖市场作了“结构”上的分类;借助于拍卖市场博弈的贝叶斯均衡解,分析了不同市场结构对拍卖市场交易效率的影响,论证了在各种可能的市场结构中,当拍卖市场具有“完全竞争性”的市场结构时,拍卖市场的交易效率是最优的;通过求解参与人的最优市场结构,得到了拍卖市场中不同类型的参与人具有不同市场结构偏好的结论,并由此揭示了导致不完全信息下拍卖市场交易效率损失的根本原因。In this paper, we mainly researched the framework and its impacts on trading efficiency of auction market under incomplete information. First, we gave a classification for auction market under incomplete information, by introducing a reasonable parameter that might describe framework properly; Second, with the aid of Bayesian Equilibrium Solution, we analyzed the impacts on trading efficiency in different framework of auction market under incomplete information, and proved that the optimal trading efficienhy could be realized when the auction market was “in a state of complete competition” under incomplete information; At last, with the help of solving player＇s optimal market framework, we obtained the result that players with different types having different preferences to their optimal framework in auction market.

关 键 词：不完全信息 市场结构参数 交易效率 最优市场结构 

分 类 号：F062.5[经济管理—政治经济学]