矿山企业竞争的先动优势与应对策略分析  

Game Analysis of Initiative Superiority of Competition and Head-on Policy in Mine Enterprises

作　　者：黄光球[1] 陆秋琴[1] 吴海燕[1] 

机构地区：[1]西安建筑科技大学管理学院,西安710055

出　　处：《有色金属》2005年第4期123-126,共4页Nonferrous Metals

基　　金：陕西省自然科学基金资助项目(2002G07);陕西省教育厅基金资助项目(01JK124)

摘　　要：通过构建的矿山企业间竞争、合作博弈模型,系统地分析市场经济条件下矿山企业间的博弈过程,指出矿山企业在不同情况下采取竞争、合作策略的基本条件。结果表明,若强势矿山企业首先挑起竞争,则取得的利润几乎是参与竞争企业利润的总和。若每个弱势矿山企业实力相当,则采取合作型生产策略更有利于应对竞争。若矿山企业实力相差较大,则矿山企业间应采取独立生产策略,强势矿山企业因生产规模大可实现最大利润,弱势矿山企业因生产规模小可实现有限利润,但最终将被淘汰。The competition and cooperation game model on mine enterprises is constructed, and the game process under market economical condition is systematically analyzed, and the basic conditions for competition or cooperation policy adoption under different circumstance are represented. The results show that if the strongest mine enterprise instigates competition, then the profit obtained by it is almost the sum of all other weak mine enterprises; if each weak mine enterprise has almost the same strength, then a cooperative production policy is good selection for competition; if each weak mine enterprise has quite different strength, then an independence production policy is optimal, the strongest mine enterprise can obtain the highest profit from its largest-scale production capacity, and the weakest mine enterprises will be eliminated finally because of their small-scale production capacity.

关 键 词：技术经济 矿山企业 博弈论 竞争 

分 类 号：F407.1[经济管理—产业经济] O225[理学—运筹学与控制论]