货币政策的时间不一致性、可信性与透明度  

Time Inconsistency,Credibility and Transparency in Monetary Policy

作　　者：程均丽[1] 刘枭[2] 

机构地区：[1]西南财经大学中国金融研究中心 [2]西南财经大学校长办公室

出　　处：《财经科学》2005年第6期26-32,共7页Finance & Economics

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目"货币政策透明度理论研究"(05CJY031)课题的阶段性成果

摘　　要：货币政策的时间不一致性导致了政策的可信性问题,这已为实践所证明。本文提出,货币政策透明度以其声誉效应为基础,对时间不一致性形成双重约束:正向约束与逆向约束,正向约束,是限制中央银行的通货膨胀倾向;而逆向约束,是克服中央银行在反时间不一致性中的过度保守倾向。Practice has shown that time inconsistency in monetary policy gives rise to the policy credibility problem. The paper indicates that monetary policy transparency can dually restrict time inconsistency based on its reputation effect, which refers to “positive” and “ negative” restriction, in specification, the former restricts central bank＇s inflation bias, and the latter overcomes its overconservatism while central bank resists time inconsistency.

关 键 词：时间不一致性 可信性 透明度 通货膨胀倾向 过度保守倾向 

分 类 号：F820[经济管理—财政学]