强制性与自愿性审计师变更下的经济后果比较——来自1997-2001年中国上市公司的经验证据  

A Comparison of the Economic Effects between Compulsory and Discretionary Auditor Selection System—Empirical Data from China Listed Companies(1997-2001)

作　　者：郑国坚[1] 吴立扬[1] 

机构地区：[1]中山大学管理学院,广东广州510275

出　　处：《当代经济科学》2005年第6期75-80,共6页Modern Economic Science

摘　　要：本文在国内较早对审计师变更后上市公司对审计师的选择行为及其经济后果进行了较为全面地实证研究,并首次比较了自愿性和强制性两种不同审计师变更的差异,运用1997-2001年的数据,我们发现,强制性变更公司和自愿性变更公司在变更前后的财务状况、审计师选择、审计意见均存在着较大的差别,并且,这些审计师选择行为与审计意见的回归结果也存在重大差异,相比之下,自愿性变更公司表现出更明显的“意见购买”迹象,它们通过选择一贯对客户出具非标比例较低的“温和”审计师这种较为隐蔽的行为在一定程度上实现了其目的。This paper empirically studies the selection behaviors for auditors for listed companies and firstly compares the differences between compulsory and discretionary selection of auditors.With data from 1997 to 2001,significant differences are found between compulsory system and discretionary system in terms of financial position,auditor selection and auditor notes. Significant differences of the regression results of selection behavior and auditor notes are also found.'Notes buying' is more obvious for discretionary selection companies that choose 'mild' auditors to achieve their ends.

关 键 词：审计师变更 自愿性变更 强制性变更 意见购买 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]