IPO市场上承销商“托市”的博弈分析  

Game Analysis of Price Stabilization in IPO Market

作　　者：范小勇[1] 梁 邓学衷[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国科学技术大学商学院

出　　处：《管理学报》2005年第5期546-550,共5页Chinese Journal of Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70371023);教育部博士点基金资助项目(20030358052)

摘　　要：运用博弈理论分析了托市行为的内在机理,证明托市是承销商与投资者均衡策略的必然结果。这一结论表明,证券监管层应积极面对事实上已经存在的承销商托市问题,建立相应的信息披露制度和操作规范,防止承销商的价格操纵,发挥托市对稳定证券市场价格、增强市场流动性的积极作用。Price stabilization is an important phenomenon in IPO market. The intrinsic mechanism of the price stabilization was explained. It was proved that the price stabilization is necessary in game between the consignees and investors. This conclusion implies that the securities supervisor should affirmatively face the existed price stabilization and enact relevant information declaration or regulation and operational criterion in order to avoid the price manipulation and make the price stabilization give its positive role in the liquidity of auction market.

关 键 词：IPO市场 托市 博弈 竞价 

分 类 号：F8[经济管理]