工程采购的代理成本  

Agency Costs of Engineering Procurement

作　　者：陈守科[1] 韦灼彬[2] 

机构地区：[1]东南大学土木工程学院,南京210096 [2]海军工程大学天津校区,天津300450

出　　处：《中国工程科学》2005年第11期66-71,共6页Strategic Study of CAE

摘　　要：以非对称信息博弈及委托-代理理论为理论背景,分析了工程采购代理成本的产生、组成及内涵关系,并对最优激励合同的设计、最优监督策略及其成本做了分析说明。Based on asymmetric information game and principal-agent theory, by analyzing the forming reasons and connotation relationships of agency costs which occurs during the process of engineering project procurement, this paper gives out the model of best contract and monitor mechanism. It also analyses the relationships between the monitor mechanism and incentive mechanism.

关 键 词：工程采购 代理成本 非对称信息博弈 委托-代理理论 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]