具有奖励惩罚结构的项目支付进度问题研究:双重角度  

Study on Project Payment Scheduling Problems with Bonus-Penalty Structure from Two Viewpoints

作　　者：何正文[1] 徐渝[1] 朱少英[1] 

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学管理学院,陕西西安710049

出　　处：《系统工程理论与实践》2005年第10期39-45,共7页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice

基　　金：国家自然科学基金海外杰出青年基金B类项目(70028102);山西省软科学研究项目(031047-4)

摘　　要：首先明确了研究的假设条件并对具有奖励惩罚结构的项目支付进度问题进行了定义;随后分别从承包商和客户两个角度构建了该问题的基本数学模型并将其扩展为基于时间和基于费用的支付模型;研究了奖励惩罚结构对合同双方收益的影响及其评价问题;针对问题的特点,开发了一种双模块模拟退火启发式算法;最后,给出一个算例的计算分析.The project payment scheduling problem with bonus-penalty structure is defined and its assumptions are identified firstly. Then the basic mathematic models of the problems are constructed from contractor＇ s and client＇ s viewpoints respectively and extended to the cases of time-based payment and cost-based payment. In addition, the influences of bonus-penalty structure on NPV of contractors and clients and how to evaluate bonus-penalty structure are discussed. And a special simulated annealing heuristics with two modules is developed as well. Ultimately, the outcomes of the paper are illustrated through an instance.

关 键 词：奖励惩罚结构 支付进度安排 数学模型 模拟退火启发式算法 

分 类 号：C935[经济管理—管理学] F224.33