寻租现象监督治理的不完全信息动态博弈分析  

A Dynamic Game Analysis on Disposal of Rent-seeking Phenomina with Incomplete Information

作　　者：王斌[1] 徐寅峰[1] 李志敏[2] 

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学管理学院,陕西西安710049 [2]青岛理工大学,山东青岛266033

出　　处：《系统工程》2005年第10期81-85,共5页Systems Engineering

基　　金：国家自然科学基金优秀创新群体资助项目(70121001);国家自然科学基金资助项目(10371094)

摘　　要：针对寻租治理过程中存在的信息不对称性,建立了政府稽查部门和利益集团之间的三个不完全信息动态模型,给出了各自的子博弈精炼贝叶斯纳什均衡。结果表明,单纯的对寻租行为进行处罚或对稽查行为进行奖励,并不能有效的减少寻租现象,而只有在处罚寻租行为的同时,对不同稽查行动进行普遍的激励,才能改善治理的效果,有效防止寻租行为。In accordance with the information unsymmetry during disposal of rent-seeking, we establish three incomplete information dynamic models involving government inspection departments and groups for profits, and then give their sub-game refined Bayesian Nash equilibrium respectively. The result shows that it can＇t effectively reduce the rent-seeking phenomina only by punishing of rent behavior or awarding of inspection behavior, while only by means of general encouraging to different inspection behavior during punishment of rent-seeking behavior, can improve disposal effect and effectively prevent rent-seeking behavior.

关 键 词：寻租 不完全信息动态博弈 子博弈精炼贝叶斯纳什均衡 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]