国际汇率制度选择的博弈论分析  

An Analysis of the Choice of International Exchange Rate Regimes in the Perspective of the Game Theory

作　　者：岳华[1] 

机构地区：[1]华东师范大学商学院,上海200062

出　　处：《华东师范大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2005年第6期105-112,共8页Journal of East China Normal University（Humanities and Social Sciences）

摘　　要：博弈论和激励理论已运用于国际汇率制度选择的研究领域。国际汇率制度选择是一种“博弈”,参与国根据其收益与成本进行选择。博弈过程分为两阶段,第一阶段是不同利益集团选择汇率制度的博弈,第二阶段是参与国政策行为的博弈,其结果必将表现为固定与浮动之间某种程度的结合。对于固定汇率制,一国很难决策是否加入,因为这涉及各成员国之间的合作问题;相反,一国却很容易决策放弃固定汇率制,因为这只涉及本国的意愿。这一理论说明了亚洲货币一体化进程的艰难。The choice of international exchange rate regimes is like a game since those countries participating in a specific system will make their choices just according to their cost and benefit.All exchange rate regimes must deal with the tradeoff between rule and discrition,as well as between cooperation and independence.Generally speaking,a country's tradeoff is between consulting and acting in unison with other countries,that is,cooperation,or it operates as a member of the community but acts on its own,that is,independence.

关 键 词：国际汇率制度 博弈论 成本 收益 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]