管理层变更与控制权市场治理效力的实证研究——以制造业上市公司为例  

Management Turnover and Market of Corporate Control——An Empirical Analysis of Chinese Listed Companies of Manufacturing

作　　者：张慕濒[1] 范从来[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京大学商学院,南京210093

出　　处：《南京大学学报（哲学．人文科学．社会科学）》2005年第6期117-126,共10页Journal of Nanjing University(Philosophy,Humanities and Social Sciences)

摘　　要：2002、2003年我国制造业上市公司各类管理层更替现象的实证分析表明,在快速增长的股权交易的推动下,我国控制权市场已经初步形成,控制权市场对管理低效企业的识别、惩戒功能已经显现。作为企业的外部控制机制,控制权市场通过控制权转移、管理层更替的途径发挥了应有的治理效力,弥补了董事会治理的不足。大力发展控制权市场要从规范股权交易、加快国家股减持和全流通进程、完善制度建设等方面进行努力。It has been clearly shown by the empirical analyses of management turnover among Chinese listed companies of manufacturing in 2002 and 2003 that the market of corporate control has been shaped in China with the promotion of equity transaction. And, as an external governance mechanism, it has been effective in selecting low-level enterprises and punishing management with control rights transference and management turnover. The market of corporate control has reduced the deficiency of the board of directors. The development of it may be guaranteed by normalization of the transaction behaviors, dilution of the equity proportion owned by state, and reinforcement of the legal systems.

关 键 词：控制权市场 管理层更替 治理效力 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]