股权分置下的“股权融资偏好”悖论之诠释  

Explanation on the Paradox of Equity Financing Preference Under Shareholdings Division

作　　者：柳松[1] 

机构地区：[1]华南农业大学经济管理学院,广东广州510642

出　　处：《广东金融学院学报》2005年第6期25-29,共5页Journal of Guangdong University of Finance

基　　金：广东省社科基金项目(04GC105);华南农业大学农业经济管理国家重点学科建设项目和校长基金项目(4700-K05020)

摘　　要：在股权分置的制度安排下,中国上市公司偏好股权融资。从融资成本、公司治理机制和企业体制等3个方面对股权融资偏好悖论进行解读,得出中国上市公司偏好股权融资的直接动因是股权融资成本低于债务融资成本、深层原因是公司控制机制的错位和治理机制的扭曲、而转型时期的双重企业体制是中国上市公司偏好股权融资的制度根源。Under shareholdings division, our listed companies prefer to equity financing. The thesis explains the paradox of equity financing preference separately from financing cost, corporate governance mechanism and corporate system, and it concludes that direct impetus of equity financing preference is lower cost of equity financing than that of debt financing, the deep reason of which is wrong place of corporate controlling mechanism and distortion of governance mechanism, institutional origin of which is dual corporate systems during transition.

关 键 词：股权融资 治理机制 融资行为 双重企业体制 

分 类 号：F832.4[经济管理—金融学]