“企业+农户”主体非的对称性所致问题解析  

Analysis on the Problems form Theory Angle in Leading Enterprises and Peasants

作　　者：张一梁[1] 

机构地区：[1]山东农业大学经管学院,山东泰安271018

出　　处：《华东经济管理》2005年第11期40-43,共4页East China Economic Management

摘　　要：“龙头企业+农户”作为农业产业化的一种主要经营模式,在实施中存在主体不对称,致使附和契约产生,道德风险问题存在,以及以企业违约为主的违约现象严重。这些问题的产生原因可以从理论角度出发运用博弈论、委托代理模型和成本收益分析解释来龙去脉,结果与现实情况基本符合。同样可以利用理论提出这些问题的解决办法,改进模式为“龙头企业+合作社+农户”、规范契约、完善法律法规以及建立风险分担机制等。The mode that ‘Leading enterprises ＋ peasants＇ is regarded as a main kind of mode of agricultural industrialization, but the inequality of subjects existing in this kind of mode usually result in echo contract, morals risk issue and the serious phenomenon that a contract is broken especially by enterprises. The reasons of these questions can be explained on game theory, principal-agent model and cost-benefit analysis from theory angle, and the result of the analysis is consistent with the reality. We can utilize the theory to put forward the solutions to these problems too： improving the mode for leading enterprise＋ cooperative society ＋ peasant, standardizing the contract, perfecting the laws and regulations and setting up the mechanism of risk allocation etc.

关 键 词：主体 非对称性 附和契约 违约 合作社 

分 类 号：F323[经济管理—产业经济]