电能现货拍卖交易中企业间默契合谋行为分析  

Analysis of Collusion Among Enterprises in the Spot Auction Transaction of Power Energy

作　　者：王伟[1] 管毅平[2] 翟海青[1] 李玉平 

机构地区：[1]上海市电力公司调度通信中心,上海市200122 [2]上海交通大学管理学院,上海市200052 [3]上海大学经济系,上海市201800

出　　处：《电力系统自动化》2005年第23期15-18,共4页Automation of Electric Power Systems

摘　　要：对电力市场改革中发电企业的竞价行为进行了分析,认为发电企业间竞争疲弱、默契合谋行 为产生的原因是:发电企业、电网企业和监管部门之间有关交易行为和股权结构的信息不对称。文 中分别计算了该发电行业名义性和实质性集中度指标HHI,结合相关企业间交互参股的经验考 察,得出了有意义的结论:该发电行业名义上处于弱寡头竞争市场,实质上处于发电投资公司实质 性控股的强寡头竞争市场。为了保证电力市场交易的竞争性和有效率,在短期无法改变发电企业 间股权结构的前提下,文中给出了治理发电企业间默契合谋行为的3条微调交易规则的对策:一是 改变市场现货结算方式;二是改变发电企业申报电价和出力的方式;三是改变现货成交电量的构成 方式。The bidding behavior of generation enterprises in power market reform is analyzed. It is suggested that the reason for insufficient competition and collusion is the asymmetric information about relevant transaction behaviors and stock structure among generation enterprises, grid company and regulatory department. Both nominal and actual intensity index HHI of power generation industry are calculated. Combined with the experience and knowledge of cross ownership of shares among relevant enterprises, a useful conclusion is drawn that the power generation industry is really in a strong oligopoly market in which generation investment companies are actually holding shares instead of a weak oligopoly market in name. To guarantee the competitiveness and efficiency of power market transactions, three pieces of advice of slightly adjusting transaction rules are given in dealing with collusion under currently unchangeable stock structure among generation enterprises. The first one is to restructure the settlement method of spot market; the second one is to change the price and power bidding mode of generation enterprises; and the last one is to change the mixture of spot transaction volume of power energy.

关 键 词：电力市场 电能现货交易 交互参股 默契合谋 

分 类 号：F062.9[经济管理—政治经济学]