适用范围与收费标准:律师风险代理收费的简明博弈分析  

Applicable Limits and Charging Standards: A Game Analysis of the Charging System of Attorney's Risk Agency

作　　者：张放[1] 邓韵[1] 

机构地区：[1]四川大学法学院,四川成都610064

出　　处：《阿坝师范高等专科学校学报》2005年第4期55-57,62,共4页Journal of Aba Teachers College

摘　　要：律师服务市场存在案件诉讼代理费何时支付以及支付多少的矛盾。对该问题建立一个完全信息静态博弈模型进行定量分析,可推导出其中存在的纯策略纳什均衡及双方可能作出的决策,找到风险代理收费方式产生的原因,并以此为据界定其适用范围与收费标准。In attorney service market, there exist the conflicts concerning the payment of lawsuit agent commission, By setting up a static game model of perfect information and making a quantitative analysis, the Nash equilibrium of pure strategies between the party and the attorney agent and the possible decisions of both sides in this non-cooperative game can be deduced, and the cause of the charge for risk agency can be found. In the light of such deduction, the applicable limits and charging standards of the charging system of attorney＇s risk agency can be specified.

关 键 词：律师风险代理收费 适用范围与收费标准 完全信息静态博弈模型 纯策略纳什均衡 

分 类 号：D926.5[政治法律—法学]