审计服务拍卖中的审计师竞标价格  

Bidding of Auditor in the Audit Service Auction

作　　者：卫建国[1] 陈超[1] 殷亚婕[1] 

机构地区：[1]中山大学管理学院,广东广州510275

出　　处：《科学．经济．社会》2005年第4期31-34,38,共5页Science Economy Society

摘　　要：在西方审计服务市场上,拍卖是审计师与客户之间一种常见的交易方式。本文试图从审计服务拍卖的角度出发,分析规模不同的会计师事务所在拍卖中将如何决定他们的竞标价格。本文研究表明:规模较大的会计师事务所的审计质量总是高于规模较小的会计师事务所,但大所与小所的竞标价格孰高孰低并不确定,它随着审计师的审计效率和审计失败预期损失的变动而变动。另外,如果考虑较长的审计任期和非审计服务合约,审计师可能会报出一个更为低廉的竞标价格,当这个竞标价格足够低时,“Low-balling”现象就会出现。In the western audit service marketing, auction is a common trade way between auditor and customer. This paper tries to consider from the perspective of audit service auction, analysis how to decide their bidding in the auction according to the different scales of accountant office. The conclusion indicates： audit quality of larger scale accountant office is always higher than that of smaller scale accountant office But it＇s uncertain that the bidding of larger accountant office and smaller accountant office Bidding varies according to the audit efficiency of auditor and expectation loss from audit fail. In addition, if considering the longer audit term of office and non-audit service contract, auditor may quote a much lower bidding. When the bidding is lower enough, the “Low-bailing” phenomenon may occur.

关 键 词：审计服务 拍卖 竞标价格 “Low-bailing”现象 

分 类 号：F239.4[经济管理—会计学]