关于赶工费用的不完全信息博弈分析  

The analyzing with incomplete information game theory for the cost of constructive acceleration

作　　者：刘伟[1] 王羽[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆交通学院管理学院,重庆400074

出　　处：《重庆交通学院学报》2006年第1期132-133,141,共3页Journal of Chongqing Jiaotong University

摘　　要：业主与承包商签订“赶工附加协议”的过程是双方针对赶工费用博弈的过程,本文分析了双方的谈判策略,并运用博弈模型进行了均衡分析,以期能指导双方的谈判,实现更优的经济效率.The course of signing ＂Constructive Acceleration Contract＂ is also the course of gaming among owner and contractor about the cost. study of this paper is based on their game strategies and bring forward the game model in order to guide the negotiation and realize more excellent economic efficiency.

关 键 词：赶工 贝叶斯纳什均衡 不完全信息 博弈论 得益 

分 类 号：F062.4[经济管理—政治经济学]