不对称信息下供应链线性激励契约委托代理分析  

Principal-agent analysis of supply chain incentive contract with asymmetric information

作　　者：李善良[1] 朱道立[1] 

机构地区：[1]苏州大学政治与公共管理学院,江苏苏州215006

出　　处：《计算机集成制造系统》2005年第12期1758-1762,共5页Computer Integrated Manufacturing Systems

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70432001)~~

摘　　要：在由1个供应商和1个零售商组成的供应链中,零售商的促销努力对市场需求有重大影响。但因信息不对称的存在,供应商无法观测到零售商的行为,这样就会产生败德行为,影响供应链的协调。对此,利用委托代理分析框架,研究了供应链中供应商和零售商之间的利益博弈;通过比较在信息对称与信息不对称情况下的线性契约,分析了不同因素对于佣金率、供应商期望收益以及代理成本的影响;最后,考察了新的观测变量对契约设计的影响。In the context of a single--supplier and single--retailer supply chain, the retailer＇s promotion efforts had great influence in market demand. However, due to asymmetric information, the supplier couldn＇t observe the retailer＇s action, the immoral action came into being so as to affect the collaboration of the whole supply chain. To deal with this problem, the game between supplier and retailer was studied from the point of principal--agency theory. By comparing the linear contract under symmetric information with asymmetric information, different parameter＇s effect on the commission rate, the agency cost and the expected income of the supplier was analyzed. Finally, how new observation variable affected the contract design was provided.

关 键 词：供应链 委托代理 不对称信息 道德风险 线性激励契约 博弈 

分 类 号：F830[经济管理—金融学]