好消息、坏消息与季报预约披露的时间选择——管理层的组合动机与信息操作  

Good News,Bad News and Timing of Quarter Reports Precontract Disclosure:——Combinatorial Motivation and Information Manipulation of Managers

作　　者：唐跃军[1] 谢仍明[1] 

机构地区：[1]南开大学公司治理研究中心,天津300071

出　　处：《财经问题研究》2006年第1期38-44,共7页Research On Financial and Economic Issues

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(70272026);教育部人文社科重点研究基地重大项目(04JJD630004);教育部哲学社会科学重大攻关项目(03JZD0018)

摘　　要：本文构建回归模型并依据中国上市公司数据进行假设检验,考察公司业绩组合(好消息与坏消息的组合)、业绩差异与一季度季报预约披露的时间选择之间的关系以及一季度季报预约披露时间的信息内涵。实证研究显示,由于一季度季报和上年年报均要求在4月30日之前披露的特殊性,上市公司管理层在信息披露的过程中可能存在组合动机与信息操作行为,一季度季报预约披露的时间选择可能关键取决于上年年报和一季度季报预约披露的好消息或坏消息带来的积极影响或消极影响的组合与权衡。In this paper, we do hypotheses testes with regression models to examine the relationship between firm performance combination （combination of “good news”and “bad news”）, performance difference and timing of first quarter reports precontract disclosure and to probe into information of first quarter reports precontract disclosure time on the data of Chinese listed companies. Empirical researches indicate that timing of first quarter reports precontract disclosure mainly rests with combination and balance of positive effect along with “good news”and negative effect along with “bad news”published in last annual financial reports and in first quarter financial reports because managers have some combinatorial motivation and information manipulation in information disclosure due to last annual financial reports and first quarter financial reports are both required to be published by the end of April 30 of every year.

关 键 词：好消息 坏消息 季报预约披露 时间选择 业绩组合 信息操作 

分 类 号：F830.9[经济管理—金融学]