基于指派博弈的供应链联盟整体设计经济模型  

Economic Model of Supply Chain Network Design Based on Assignment Game

作　　者：梁梁[1] 王志强[1] 汤卫君[1] 熊立[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国科学技术大学管理学院,安徽合肥230026

出　　处：《中国科学技术大学学报》2005年第6期919-926,共8页JUSTC

基　　金：国家863项目资助课题(2002AA41361);教育部博士点基金资助项目(20030358052).

摘　　要：结合供应链运作的特点,从指派博弈的角度分析了供应链企业的合作战略.将供应链整体设计经济模型向多层拓展,得到了一个最大化联盟利润的多层供应链整体设计经济模型,并证实了模型中合作博弈核心解的存在性.研究表明:供应链联盟核心企业在联盟内部供应链成员企业生产成本和意愿支付的基础上指导其合理地安排合作关系,可以使得供应链整体收益达得到优化.而且,由于此合作战略符合合作博弈核心,其实施进一步提高了供应链联盟的整体稳定性.Based on the operation characteristics of a supply chain, we analyze the cooperative strategy of the assignment game. By extending the economic model of supply chain network from monolayer to multiplayer, a multi-echelon supply chain network is obtained with the purpose of maximizing their profits, and the existence of the core solution is proved. The study shows that the core enterprises in the supply chain alliance can maximize their whole profits by arranging the cooperation relationships among member enterprises properly under their total production cost and willingness-payment constraint. Since this cooperation strategy meets the definition of the core, its practice can enhance the stability of supply chains.

关 键 词：指派博弈 供应链 合作博弈 核心 

分 类 号：O225[理学—运筹学与控制论]