银企信贷重复博弈的模型分析  

Modelling on Repeated Games in Bank-Enterprise Credit Relations

作　　者：田银华[1] 何建明[1] 曹家瑛[1] 

机构地区：[1]湘潭大学商学院

出　　处：《系统工程》2005年第11期82-84,共3页Systems Engineering

摘　　要：银企关系的稳定与否最终体现在信贷关系上,在信息不对称的前提下,基于企业对其声誉的考虑,本文论述了银企信贷重复博弈的理性选择路径,从而最大限度地预防和解决银企单次信贷博弈的负面作用和影响。Generally speaking, the stability degrees of Bank-Enterprise Relationship depend on their Credit Relations. Under the Asymmetry of information, in consideration of Enterprises＇ reputation, this paper discusses the repeated games in bank-enterprise credit relations and their multiple-choice ways, thus to prevent and solve some negative effects of the once game of credit.

关 键 词：银企信贷关系 企业声誉 博弈论 

分 类 号：F830[经济管理—金融学]