论个体可转让配额制度的经济效率  

On the efficiency of the individual transferable quota system

作　　者：杨正勇[1] 朱伟伟[1] 史君英[1] 车斌[1] 高健[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海水产大学经济与贸易学院

出　　处：《上海水产大学学报》2005年第4期432-436,共5页Journal of Shanghai Fisheries University

基　　金：上海水产大学校长基金项目(科04-099)

摘　　要：首先回顾了个体可转让配额制度的思想起源,接着在新古典经济学的框架下重点讨论了该制度的效率,指出若新古典假设得以满足,该制度能防止捕捞努力的过度增长和租金浪费,从而能纠正开放性进入下扭曲的资源配置。然后以新古典均衡为参照物,讨论了交易成本的存在对个体可转让配额制度的效率的影响。指出交易成本的存在会不仅导致个体可转让配额数量和价格偏离帕雷托最优水平,还会直接抵减制度收益,从而产生效率损失。因此,如果我国要实行该制度,必须寻找降低其交易成本的有效方法。The evolution of the idea of the individual transferable quota（1TQ） system was introduced in the first part of the paper. And then under the neo-classic assmnptions, the efficiency of ITQ system and its mechanism to correct the distortion of the efficiency of utilization on the fisheries resources under open access system were discussed in detail in the second part of the paper. ITQ system was proved to be efficient under such assumptions. In the third part of the paper, transaction costs of ITQ system and their influence on its efficiency were analyzed on the basis of the neo-classic equilibrium, and the following conclusions were reached that the existence of transaction costs can not only cause deflection of quantity and price of quotas from Pareto efficient level, but also offset the benefits of the system. So practical methods to reduce transaction costs of the system have to be found in order to adopt it in China.

关 键 词：个体可转让配额制度 经济效率 交易成本 

分 类 号：F326.4[经济管理—产业经济]