独立董事对报酬与风险的取向──基于深交所的实证研究  

Independent Director's Compensation and Risk Taking

作　　者：唐清泉[1] 

机构地区：[1]中山大学管理学院,广东广州510275

出　　处：《财经理论与实践》2006年第1期51-55,共5页The Theory and Practice of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70272021)

摘　　要：尽管独立董事在主业中拥有较高的社会地位和财富,但仍需要报酬的激励;高认知能力的独立董事,不仅获得了更高的报酬,也更具有回避风险的能力;与低学历高职务独立董事相比,高学历低职务独立董事的报酬具有高风险高报酬的特征。这些结果表明,在实施独立董事制度中独立董事不可能是免费的代理人,因此,应从独立董事辞职、报酬机制和降低风险的角度加以改进。Though the independent directors own high social position and rich wealth, there still needs compensation as an incentive for their creative work. The more cognitive resources the independent directors possess, the more compensation and the more risk avoidance they have. Compared with the lower education background and higher professional position, the directors with higher education background and lower professional position have characteristics of higher risk and higher compensation. These results implicate that independent directors are not free agents. Some suggestions are given to avoid the resign phenomena of independent directors, to improve compensation mechanisms and to reduce risks.

关 键 词：公司治理 独立董事报酬 独立董事风险 风险取向 

分 类 号：F830.91[经济管理—金融学]