MCP机制下的发电商报价策略研究  

Study of bidding strategies for generation companies in market clear price mechanism

作　　者：周建中[1] 莫莉[1] 吴玮[1] 曹广晶[2] 

机构地区：[1]华中科技大学水电与数字化工程学院,湖北武汉430074 [2]中国长江三峡工程开发总公司

出　　处：《华中科技大学学报（自然科学版）》2006年第1期84-86,共3页Journal of Huazhong University of Science and Technology(Natural Science Edition)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(5053914050579022)

摘　　要：建立了一个考虑发电商的单位成本、最高报价、低于和等于市场出清价格(MCP)竞价成功的两种可能性概率的不完全信息模型.针对该模型,提出用预期市场出清电价和贝叶斯博弈结合的方法,求出以发电商收益最大为目标的报价策略,为电力市场内发电商的报价提供了一种新的分析途径.An incomplete information model considering the unit cost and the maximum bidding price of power generation companies, the probabilities of winning below or on the margin was built. Aiming at the model, the bidding strategies hosed on both expected MCP and Bayesian game theory were proposed. It provided maximizing profit of generation companies and an efficient way to the bidding strategy of the power generation companies in electricity market.

关 键 词：发电商 预期市场出清价 贝叶斯博弈 报价策略 

分 类 号：F407.6[经济管理—产业经济]