存在接入的软件产品最优信息公开度博弈分析  

Game Analysis of Optimal Information Openness of Software with Access

作　　者：王文举[1] 范合君[1] 

机构地区：[1]首都经济贸易大学,北京100026

出　　处：《哈尔滨工业大学学报（社会科学版）》2006年第1期73-76,共4页Journal of Harbin Institute of Technology(Social Sciences Edition)

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(02EJY003);北京市教委人文;社会科学研究课题(SM200410038021)

摘　　要：利用博弈理论分析在操作系统领域处于垄断地位,而在应用软件市场处于竞争状态的软件厂商的操作系统软件最优信息公开度问题。公开操作系统部分信息可以产生两方面效应,一方面会在竞争性应用软件市场引入竞争对手降低应用软件的利润;另一方面随着应用软件种类的增多,消费者对操作系统的评价也会提高,操作系统提供商可以提高操作系统的价格。因此操作系统软件厂商要对二者进行权衡。通过以上分析得出应当公开所有操作系统信息的结论,并对操作系统与竞争性应用软件的最优定价问题进行了研究。This paper analyzes the degree of optimal information publicity under the operation system （OS） which is monopolist in OS but suffer competition from application software. Publicize interface information will produce two kinds of effect. On the one hand it will introduce competition which will cut the profit of the software dealers. On the other hand it can raise the consumer appreciation of OS as application software become more and more in number. So there is a trade - off for the OS firm. The authors propose a game model and conclude that OS firm should completely publicize all the interface information. The optimal pricing strategy of OS and application software is also discussed in this article.

关 键 词：操作系统 应用软件 信息公开度 博弈 

分 类 号：F062.5[经济管理—政治经济学]