有限专利保护下创业阶段性融资中投资者道德风险行为分析  

Moral Hazard of Investor in Staged Financing of Venture under Limited Patent Law

作　　者：陈衍泰[1] 司春林[1] 徐震[1] 

机构地区：[1]复旦大学管理学院,上海200433

出　　处：《科学学与科学技术管理》2006年第1期116-120,共5页Science of Science and Management of S.& T.

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究重点项目(02JAZ790003);国家自然科学基金项目<企业开放式创新与产权市场无缝隙再造研究>(70502006)

摘　　要：阶段性投资是风险投资最显著的特征。在知识产权保护不足的情况下,企业家可能被迫接受投资者的报价,或者投资者可能盗用企业家的创新思想。因此验证了专利保护的重要性,一方面是在激励创新和限制专利持有人垄断优势之间起平衡作用;另外的目标是减少在创业投资阶段性融资过程中的风险,以促进创新的实现。The staging of capital is the most notable feature of venture financing. The entrepreneur may be forced to accept the investor＇s quote price under the insufficiency of intellectual property protect. The impact of patent law is important. Patent law is primarily seen as an instrument balancing the trade-off between setting incentives to innovate and limiting monopoly power of patent holders. In addition, there is another goal of patent law： reducing conflicts in the venture financing process thereby to make innovations more likely,

关 键 词：创业投资 阶段性融资 投资者道德风险 有限专利保护 

分 类 号：F830.56[经济管理—金融学] G306.3[文化科学]