龙头企业与农户订单安排与履约:理论和来自浙江企业的实证分析  

Dragon-head Companies and Enforcement of Contract-farming Between the Agribusiness Firmsand Farmers: Theory and Practice in Zhejiang Province

作　　者：郭红东[1] 

机构地区：[1]浙江大学农业现代化与农村发展研究中心,杭州310029

出　　处：《农业经济问题》2006年第2期36-42,共7页Issues in Agricultural Economy

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"中国订单农业发展的理论与实证研究"课题(项目编号:70373027);国家社科重大项目"解决中国三农问题的理论;思路与对策研究"(项目编号:04ZD012)的资助

摘　　要：本文首先建立了一个企业与农户订单履约的博弈模型,提出了订单安排和订单履约关系的理论假设,然后运用浙江省农业龙头企业的调查数据进行了实证研究。实证结果表明,实行“保底收购、随行就市”的订单履约率要明显高于其他价格条款的订单履约率;对农户专门投入有要求和有奖励措施条款的订单履约率要高于没有这些条款的订单履约率;订单组织形式、订单类型、订单期限以及赔偿条款对订单的履约率有影响,但影响不显著。This empirical study explores the relations between the contract arrangements and its performance with a game model. Based on 116 agribusiness firms in Zhejiang, the author reveals that the protection price has a positive effect on the contract performance. The special requirements for inputs and others have produced incentives to the farmers. In contrast, the contract duration, fine due to breaking the contract and others have little effects on the contract performance

关 键 词：订单农业 龙头企业 农户 订单安排 订单履约率 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]