基于三方动态博弈模型的软预算约束成因及影响  

Analysis of Causes and Impacts of Soft Budget Constraints of Enterprises Based on Dynamic Game for Three Players

作　　者：曹国华[1] 滕进华[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400030

出　　处：《重庆大学学报（自然科学版）》2006年第1期128-131,共4页Journal of Chongqing University

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助(70571089)

摘　　要：从银行信贷的相关利益者的动态博弈出发,建立一个政府、银行和企业之间的三方博弈模型来分析它们之间的目标和行为差异从而对企业软预算约束成因及其影响.模型分析显示:政府出于对社会就业和稳定的考虑,有强烈的动机通过控制、补贴银行来实施对企业的软预算约束.而银行即使在其本身对再融资没有兴趣的前提下,在衡量了政府补贴和清算得失之后也有可能对企业再贷款.除此之外,项目清算值和新项目的出现及其质量的高低也是影响银行再贷款的重要因素.This paper researches the behavior difference among government, banks and enterprises and how it affects soft budget constraints of enterprises and non-performing loans of banks based with dynamic game. The game model suggests that government will give banks some assistance and let them refinance enterprises, especially government has strong incentive to sustain SOEs in China＇ s transitional economy. Banks will do it if the assistance from government is more than the loss from refinance enterprises. In addition the value of liquidation of enterprises and the new loans affect banks＇ refinancing old enterprises.

关 键 词：软预算约束 银行风险 不良贷款 动态博弈 

分 类 号：F830.5[经济管理—金融学]