中介企业协同竞争的演化均衡分析  

Evolutionary Equilibrium Analysis on Coopetition in Intermediary Industry

作　　者：杨玉红[1] 陈忠[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学安泰管理学院,上海200052

出　　处：《系统工程理论方法应用》2006年第1期26-31,38,共7页Systems Engineering Theory·Methodology·Applications

基　　金：高等学校博士点科研基金资助项目(20020248020)

摘　　要：中介企业通过提供信息,将买卖双方联系起来。当一个中介企业受买方或卖方的委托,为其寻找交易伙伴时,既可以选择自己去搜寻信息,也可以选择与拥有该信息的另一个企业合作,共同促成这桩交易。为了探究中介企业之间的这种协同竞争机制,更好地引导中介企业稳定健康发展,本文用两个演化博弈模型描述了中介企业之间的竞争与合作关系,指出:①在不同的成本与收益约束下,中介企业之间的竞争与合作会收敛到不同的演化稳定策略。当中介企业独立促成交易能获得正的净收益时,他会选择竞争的策略;当中介企业搜寻信息的成本较高,独自完成交易无利可图时,才有同其他中介企业进行合作的可能。②中介市场的初始条件决定演化均衡结果。The intermediary enterprises connect the buyers and supplier by providing them with desired information. With information of buyer （or supplier）, the intermediary enterprises can either search for supplier （or buyer） or ask for other intermediary enterprises that possess corresponding information. It is a significant issue that which one will become the final choice？ In order to promote the robust development of intermediary industry, we must explore the coopetition mechanism among intermediary enterprises. By two evolutionary game models, the coopetition relationship has been discussed. The main conclusions are as follows： （1） with different cost and payoff restriction, the coopetition relationship converges to different ESS （evolutionary stable strategy）. If intermediary enterprises can expect a positive net payoff to complete the connection independently, they will reject cooperation. In contrast to this, if the information research cost is high enough exhausting the profit, they may choose to cooperate with their competitors. （2） The ESS is also determined by the initial state of the intermediary market.

关 键 词：系统理论 协同竞争 演化博弈论 中介企业 

分 类 号：TP18[自动化与计算机技术—控制理论与控制工程]