国家控制银行:从银行退出的逻辑起点——中国银行业改革的政治经济学分析  

Country Controlling Bank:The Starting Position of Country's Exiting from Banking System

作　　者：耿同劲[1] 

机构地区：[1]郑州大学商学院,河南郑州450052

出　　处：《西安财经学院学报》2006年第1期5-9,共5页Journal of Xi’an University of Finance & Economics

摘　　要：虽然充满效率的非国有经济更有利于国家满足税收增加和经济增长的效用,但为了满足政权存续的效用,国家必然对银行实施严格的控制,通过给低效的国有经济提供金融补贴来避免其衰退引发社会政治动荡。当国有经济的式微或大规模变革不再对国家政权的生存构成威胁时,国家控制银行的收益递减,而其成本则由于国有银行的败德行为而加速递增,国家就有激励从银行退出。国家声誉资本的不可分割性使得国家几乎不存在退出路径,而真实资本的分割性为国家提供了一条通过对国有银行的股份制改造渐进退出的路径选择。Although non-stated-owned economy make great contribution to meeting the county＇s utility of tax increasing and economy developing, country control banking system in order to subsiding stated-owned economy yet, because the recession of stated-owned economy can＇t threaten the existence of regime, the benefit of country controlling banking system decrease, while the cost increase rapidly, therefore, country have the stimulation to exit from banking system. It is very hard for country＇s exiting from banking system because of the indivisibility of country＇s reputation capital, however, the divisibility of real capital can supply country with a possible channel of exiting.

关 键 词：国有银行 金融补贴 股份制改造 

分 类 号：F832.1[经济管理—金融学]