监管者的最优激励问题  

A Study on the Regulators' Optimal Incentive Level

作　　者：张慧莲[1] 沈伟基[2] 

机构地区：[1]北京工业大学经济与管理学院,北京100872 [2]中国人民大学财政金融学院,北京100872

出　　处：《山西财经大学学报》2006年第1期105-108,共4页Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics

摘　　要：文章借鉴了西方学者关于最优执法制度选择模型的基本思想,发展出监管者最优执法激励模型,得出监管者的最优激励水平必须综合考虑监管者调查取证的成本、监管者的职业素质和道德水准,以及违法者的比例等实际因素的结论,并就该模型应用于证券市场监管提出了一些具体的建议。This paper is based on the optimal enforcement institutional choice theory provided by some western scholars. It puts forward two new models to describe the conditions under which optimal enforcement incentive level is determined. It then concludes that the optimal incentive level for regulators should be integrated into some real factors, such as regulators＇ search costs, their self- esteem and long-run respect of their peers from their good job, and the guilty share as well. This paper also offers some reasonable advice for securities markets regulation.

关 键 词：监管者 执法激励 调查成本 

分 类 号：F830[经济管理—金融学]