投机冲击和固定汇率制的退出  

Speculative Attacks and Abandonment of Fixed Exchange-rate Regime

作　　者：卢惠[1] 何璋[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京师范大学经济与工商管理学院,北京100875

出　　处：《北京师范大学学报（社会科学版）》2006年第1期132-137,共6页Journal of Beijing Normal University(Social Sciences)

摘　　要：在客观的国际金融形势不断发展的情况下,第一代投机冲击模型在具有理性和前瞻性的政策制定者面前显得缺乏解释力。从模型分析可以发现,政策的制定者完全能够通过引入不确定性因素到投机者的决策中以避免可预期的投机冲击。该行为可将突然的袭击时间延长即增长投机和不确定性的期限,同时也可以扰乱投机者以及大众的心理预期。除此之外,模型还为分析当前中国汇率体制改革所面对的机遇和挑战提供了一种有利的视角。This paper makes an attempt to demonstrate that the implications of the first generation speculative attack models do not hold if there is a rationalw forward-looking policy maker. The policy maker could avoid a predictable specula- tive attack by introducing uncertainty factors into the speculators＇ decisions, the measurement of which may change a sudden attack into a prolonged period of increasing speculation and uncertainty. Additionally, it also provides an effective way to analyze the present exchange-rate regime in China.

关 键 词：投机冲击 固定汇率制 热钱 

分 类 号：F832.61[经济管理—金融学]