出口企业应对反倾销搭便车行为分析  

The Analysis of Free-riding Behavior of Exporting Enterprises against Anti-dumping

作　　者：郭守亭[1] 赵君峰[1] 

机构地区：[1]中南财经政法大学工商管理学院,湖北武汉430060

出　　处：《中南财经政法大学学报》2006年第2期120-123,共4页Journal of Zhongnan University of Economics and Law

摘　　要：在国际贸易中,当出口企业面临国外的反倾销指控时,出口国同类产品出口企业都有义务积极应诉,但是每个企业都存在搭便车倾向。本文通过一个博弈论模型分析这种免费搭车现象的存在动因,讨论了哪些企业最易搭便车,市场结构对企业应诉反倾销行为的影响以及政府如何激励出口企业积极应诉。In international trade,when exporting enterprises face the accusation of foreign anti-dumping,all export-oriented enterprises are obliged to counteract it actively,but each enterprise has the inclination of free-riding.This paper analyses the reason of this kind free-riding phenomenon through a game theory model,in which it analyses what kinds of exporting enterprises are apt to free-riding,the influence of market structure on their behavior of counteracting anti-dumping and how the government encourage exporting enterprises to counteracting anti-dumping lawsuit actively.

关 键 词：反倾销 搭便车 个体收益 货币贡献 

分 类 号：F746.12[经济管理—国际贸易]