中央政府与地方政府的政策博弈及其治理  

Policy Games and their Solutions between Central Government and Local Governments

作　　者：夏永祥[1] 王常雄[2] 

机构地区：[1]苏州大学中国农村城镇化研究中心,江苏苏州215021 [2]苏州大学商学院,江苏苏州215021

出　　处：《当代经济科学》2006年第2期45-51,共7页Modern Economic Science

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地2004年度重大项目的阶段性研究成果(项目批准号:04JDZH005)

摘　　要：本文描述了中央政府和地方政府政策博弈的凸现与加剧,认为这种政策博弈的制度性根源是市场取向的分权制以及以GDP为核心的政绩指标考核体系,制度性根源对政策博弈具有传导机制。这种政府博弈的积极影响促进了中央政府政策的更加合理、完善,而消极影响则是中央政府调控能力大打折扣、中央政府遭遇信任危机和扰乱市场秩序。治理途径则在于建立新型中央政府和地方政府关系,采取消除政策博弈的措施,即真正做到财权与事权的统一、建立居民的退出与呼吁机制、构建更加合理的政绩观与指标考评体系。This article describes the policy games between central government and local governments.We hold that the institutional reason of the policy games is market orientated decentralization and political rank-order system with GDP as key indicator.The positive effect of the policy games is the optimization of the central government policies.However,policy games have negative impacts,such as the weakening of central government control,trust default,and deterioration of market environments.Finally,we recommend solutions as to establish new relationships between central government and local governments,to harmonize fiscal right and expenditure responsibility,to establish exit and voice systems of citizens,and to construct rational assessment indicator system for political performance.

关 键 词：政策博弈 中央政府 地方政府 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]