双重委托代理下的股利政策研究  

Study on Dividend Policy under Double Principal-agent Theory

作　　者：易颜新[1] 张晓[1] 

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学管理学院,陕西西安710049

出　　处：《当代经济科学》2006年第2期110-115,共6页Modern Economic Science

摘　　要：我国上市公司股权相对集中或高度集中,存在大股东与经营者、中小股东与大股东之间的双重委托代理关系,大股东利用信息不对称攫取中小股东利益。本文将股利政策作为一个可观测变量引入单层、双重委托代理模型,详细分析了降低代理成本的途径。研究结论认为,在单层和双重委托代理关系下,将股利政策作为一种信息传递机制,写入激励合同,可以降低风险成本和总代理成本。China listed companies with centralized ownership have double principal-agent relationships between stakeholders and managers and between small shareholders and stakeholders.Stakeholders snatch benefit from small shareholders.This article builds single and double principal-agent theory models and studies measures to reduce agent cost by using dividend policy as an observable variable.The result shows that dividend policy can reduce risk agent cost and total agent cost in single and double principal-agent theory models.

关 键 词：双重委托代理理论 股利政策 大股东 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]