特许权人风险厌恶条件下的基础设施特许权合约分析  

Analysis of the infrastructure concession contract when the concessionaire is risk-averse

作　　者：于国安[1] 

机构地区：[1]河南财经学院工商管理系,河南郑州450002

出　　处：《合肥工业大学学报（自然科学版）》2006年第3期361-364,共4页Journal of Hefei University of Technology：Natural Science

摘　　要：一个基础设施特许权合约,可以被看作一个委托代理框架下的报酬支付合约。基于这样一个理论框架,利用逆向递推方法,文章对没有政府担保下,特许权人为风险厌恶的政府特许权合约的报酬设计进行分析,给出了政府特许权人的风险态度和服务定价之间的关系。An infrastructure concession contract can be regarded as a payoff contract in the principal-agent theory. Based on this theory, an analysis of the problem of payoff to the concessionaire in the concession contract when there are not government guarantees and the concessionaire is risk-averse is carried out by using the backward-induction method. The influence of the risk of the infrastructure concession project on user charges is also analyzed.

关 键 词：政府担保 风险厌恶 政府特许权项目 合约设计 

分 类 号：F83[经济管理—金融学]