不结盟对策的系统结构和各级局势判断间的导出关系  

Systems of Nonalignment Games and the Derived Relationship of All-level Situation Judgment

作　　者：姜殿玉[1] 

机构地区：[1]淮海工学院数理科学系,江苏连云港222005

出　　处：《淮海工学院学报（自然科学版）》2006年第1期1-3,共3页Journal of Huaihai Institute of Technology:Natural Sciences Edition

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(78970025)

摘　　要：介绍了在封闭系统———经典对策论基础上建立开放系统———数理谋略论的基本思想,并用数学方法对已有成果———不结盟对策系统的结构和各级局势判断间的导出关系进行了概述.结果是得出了在新系统下Nash平衡的存在性和各级局势判断间的导出关系,并得出了新对策系统是经典对策系统的一个“中国化”发展的主要结论.This paper introduces the basic idea of formulating an open system, i. e. mathematical strategy theory, on the basis of the closed system, the classical game theory. It adopts mathematical methods to summarize the systems of nonalignment games and the derived relationship of all-level situation judgment. The main results are the existence and the derived relationship of alllevel situation judgment of Nash equilibrium under the new system. Hence it concludes that the new game system is a Chinese-form development of the classical one.

关 键 词：数理谋略论 不结盟对策 局势判断 

分 类 号：O225[理学—运筹学与控制论]