农村劳动力转移的进化博弈论分析  

On Game Theory Analysis to Rural Labor Force Transferring and Evolving

作　　者：杨树成[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆文理学院数学与计算机科学系,重庆永川402160

出　　处：《重庆文理学院学报（自然科学版）》2006年第1期39-42,共4页Journal of Chongqing University of Arts and Sciences

摘　　要：费景汉(J.Fei)和拉尼斯(G.Ranis)模型以及托达罗(M.P.Todaro)模型虽都较适用于我国的实情,但忽视了农民心理、城乡文化差异、迁移风险和制度因素等对农村劳动力转移的制约和影响,没有从农民的决策行为去考察农村劳动力的转移问题.根据有限理性“新经济人”假说和行为决策理论,用Taylor and Jonker(1978)的模仿者动态(Replicator Dynamics)模型从理论上能够较好地分析农民进城的决策选择.J. Fei, G. Ranis model and M. P. Todaro model although all applied to the Chinese true state, neglected the influence and the restraint of the farmer mental state, city country cultural difference, moving risk and system factor to the transferring of rural labor force. They did not analyze the transferring problem of the rural labor force from the decision behavior of the farmer. To use Taylor and jonker （ 1978 ） imitator development （ Replicator Dynamics） can analyze the decision choice to the farmer going into the city according to the limited reasonableness ＂new economic person＂ hypothesis and the behavior decision theory from theoretically.

关 键 词：劳动力转移 有限理性 模仿者动态(Replicator Dynamics)模型 

分 类 号：F323.6[经济管理—产业经济]