攻防态势与政治联合的最佳规模  

Offense-Defense State and the Optimal Scale of Political Coalition

作　　者：孙德刚[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海外国语大学中东研究所,上海200083

出　　处：《外交评论（外交学院学报）》2006年第2期65-72,共8页Foreign Affairs Review

摘　　要：赖克认为,在零和游戏中,政治联合会自动生成能够确保获胜的最小规模,即政治联合的最佳规模,但这一理论很难解释1991年海湾战争和2003年伊拉克战争期间美国领导的政治联合在规模上存在的巨大差异。本文认为,攻防态势与政治联合的规模之间存在重要联系。防御型政治联合旨在制衡威胁,政治联合背后的基本逻辑是威胁平衡,政治联合的规模一般较大;进攻型政治联合多是为了追逐利益,其构建的内在逻辑是利益平衡,政治联合的规模一般较小。As William Riker puts it, in zero-sum games, only minimum winning coalitions oceur. Nevertheless, this hypothesis can hardly explain the striking divergence of the coalition scales during the Gulf War （1991） and Iraq War （2003） led by the United States. This paper argues that there is an important correlation between the offense-defense state and the scale of coalition. Specifically, defensive coalition aims at balancing threat, and the basic logic of the coalition formation is to maintain a balance of threat; the offensive coalition aims at pursuing interest, and the basic logic of the coalition formation is to maintain a balance of interest. Hence the former has a cnmparatively larger scale while the latter has a smaller one.

关 键 词：政治联合 攻防态势 威胁平衡 利益平衡 最佳规模 

分 类 号：D815[政治法律—国际关系]