裁员视角下人力资源最优激励机制设计  

The Design of Optimal Incentive Mechanism for Layoff Human Resource under Layoff

作　　者：雷勇[1] 蒲勇健[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400044

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2006年第2期89-91,共3页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：教育部博士点基金资助项目(20020611009);教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目(02JA790062)

摘　　要：在假定产出可以观测的条件下,构造企业与员工之间的委托-代理激励模型,针对企业员工有效劳动时间是对称信息和非对称信息,分别设计包含裁员概率的企业最优激励合同,然后讨论裁员概率如何对激励合同与员工积极性产生影响。Under the condition of the output of employees being measured, the principal-agent models between employee and enterprise are respectively constructed aiming at the efficient working time of employees with complete information or in asymmetry information. Then the optimal incentive contracts arc put forward, which contain the layoff probability. Then, it has been discussed that how the layoff probability affects the incentive contracts and the positivity of employees.

关 键 词：对称信息 非对称信息 裁员概率 机制设计 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]