“公共地悲剧”的博弈分析  

An Analysis of the Game of "the Tragedy of the Commons"

作　　者：李仁安[1] 黄轶芳[1] 

机构地区：[1]武汉理工大学管理学院,湖北武汉430070

出　　处：《商业研究》2006年第7期82-84,共3页Commercial Research

基　　金：武汉市软科学重点项目;项目编号:20044005070-08;湖北省科技攻关项目;项目编号:2002AA401C19

摘　　要：博弈中往往会出现个人理性和集体理性的矛盾,使得公共资源产权界定不清,社会资源不能得到很好的利用。必须对“公共地悲剧”进行博弈分析,运用博弈理论中的Nash均衡和反应函数讨论公共资源低效率配置的原因和造成的后果,这样才能说明环境资源保护的社会意义。There often emerge conflicts between individual rationality and collective rationality in Came Theory. It makes the property right of public resource unclear in definition so that social resources cannot get reasonablly used. By analysing ＂The Tragedy of the Commons＂, this paper explains the reason and consequence leading to the lowered efficiency af utilizing public resources by applying Nash Equilibrium and reacting function. It aims at indicating the social effect d environmental protection.

关 键 词：博弈 那什均衡 环境产权 

分 类 号：F205[经济管理—国民经济]