高等教育文凭信号的经济学解析  

An Economic Analysis of the Signals of Higher Education Diploma

作　　者：贺尊[1] 

机构地区：[1]华中科技大学经济学院

出　　处：《比较教育研究》2006年第4期16-20,共5页International and Comparative Education

摘　　要：由于劳动力市场信息不对称,招聘大学生是一种风险投资决策。大学毕业生择业与考研受到来自市场工资与预期收益率的影响。高等教育文凭信号仅发挥着筛选与甄别作用,是社会所需要设置的、不完备衡量大学生工作能力的“过滤分拣器”。人力资本理论在教育收益率方面已呈现出危机。笔者认为,优质高等教育文凭信号是解救当前教育体制的无效率,促进高等教育可持续发展的引擎。Under asymmetric information of job market, recruiting college students is a risky investment decision to make. An undergraduate＇ s decision for choosing a job or participating in the examination of postgraduate study is influenced by both wages and expected benefit ratio. The signals of higher education diploma are just a tool of filtration and screening to meet the needs of the society. They are imperfect to measure a college student＇ s productive capability. The theory of human capital has already displayed the crisis in educational benefit ratio. The author thinks that the optimal signals of higher education diploma are an engine to rescuer the current inefficiency of educational system and to promote the sustainable development of higher education.

关 键 词：高等教育 大学生就业 文凭信号 经济学解析 

分 类 号：G640[文化科学—高等教育学]