遵从与变通:煤矿安全监管中的地方行为分析  

Compliance or Cover-up: A Study of Local Governance in China's Coal-mining Industry

作　　者：钟开斌[1] 

机构地区：[1]清华大学公共管理学院,北京100084

出　　处：《公共管理学报》2006年第2期70-75,共6页Journal of Public Management

基　　金：北京市哲学社会科学"十五"规划项目(04BJDZH050)

摘　　要：改革开放以来,在重特大矿难事故频发的同时,地方瞒报等虚假治理现象也非常突出,成为中国煤矿安全监管面临的一个严峻挑战。引入了一个有关地方政府治理选择的模型,集中分析煤矿安全监管中地方官员基于成本-收益原则与中央与地方之间委托-代理关系基础上的行为选择;通过比较地方政府虚假治理和诚实治理的成本和收益,揭示了影响地方政府治理选择的因素及其作用过程。结论表明,在当前的制度背景下,虚假治理很可能在一定程度上、一定范围内成为地方的普遍选择,为此,需要进一步改革和调整中国煤矿安全监管制度,强化国家制度建设。The actual number of fatal accidents in China's coal-mining industry could be much higher. Meanwhile, a lot of accidents are widespread underreported and covered up by local government officials and mine owners, which is a great challenge for China's coal-mining security supervision. This paper constructs a model of local government governance to analyze the dishonest behavior of local government officials and mine owners based on cost-benefit analysis and principal-agent relationship. It aims to show the factors that influence local government governance and their functions and hopes to generate insights on the boundaries and strategies of the local governments and the society in the context of social regulation. It is demonstrated that local officials, with the aid and knowledge of mine owners, have strong incentive to cover up deaths at their jurisdictions.

关 键 词：煤矿安全 政府监管 事故瞒报 中央与地方关系 

分 类 号：D625[政治法律—政治学]